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1983 ACTION FOR GROSS NEGLIGENCE
Rather than determine the issue, however, the court left it for "further
sifting through the lower courts."5
CONCLUSION
Both from the standpoint of providing equitable treatment for all
maritime workers and from the standpoint of providing a more uniform
body of law in the maritime tort area, there is little question but that
Moragne is properly decided. The inequity of the pre-Moragne law, as
pointed out by Justice Goldberg, was so apparent as to be beyond dispute.
The only real choices open to the court in eliminating this inequity were
to reduce the recovery available to land-based workers so as to bring them
into line with seagoing workers, or to extend the recovery available to sea-
going workers. In light of recent trends in tort law-not only in maritime
law, but also in products liability and other areas-for the Court to have
chosen the first alternative would have been to turn back the hands of
time. Its commendable choice of the second alternative creates a uniform,
equitable and much more easily understandable body of law to replace
what had been a totally unsatisfactory morass.
Louis W. PAYNE, JR.
Civil Rights-Section 1983 Action Lies for Gross and
Culpable Negligence
Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 United States Code
section 1983,1 in recent years has been relied upon increasingly by in-
dividuals seeking redress for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights
under color of law. In Jenkins v. Averett,2 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has broadened the scope of conduct actionable under this
statute. Robert Jenkins, an 18-year-old black youth, was shot by a police-
man in the course of a pursuit following a confrontation with some white
youths in Asheville, North Carolina. Jenkins brought suit in the United
States District Court to recover damages under section 1983, and for
50 Id. at 408.
142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) states:
Every person vho, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
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assault and battery under a pendent state claim. While Jenkins claimed
that the shooting-resulting in a six-inch hole in his thigh-was in-
tentional, the officer testified that his gun fired accidentally as he returned
it to his holster.' The district court found that the shooting was not in-
tentional, but did find that the policeman was grossly or culpably negligent.
Based on these findings, the court rejected the section 1983 claim but held
the defendant liable on the state cause of action.4
The court of appeals, in reversing the lower court's decision on the
section 1983 claim, held that the defendant's "reckless use of excessive
force" 5 amounted to a deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional right
to be free from injuries arbitrarily inflicted by the police.' Hence, grossly
or culpably negligent police action was found to be sufficiently arbitrary
for the purposes of the federal statute.
Although section 1983 is silent as to the type of conduct actionable
under its provisions, prior to Jenkins no recovery had been allowed for
anything less than intentional conduct. Indeed, the District Judge had
dimissed the federal claim in Jenkins because there was no finding of
intent, but allowed the state claim for assault and battery on the principle
that gross or culpable negligence, in lieu of intentional conduct, may be
actionable in North Carolina.7 Judge Sobeloff, writing for the majority,
reversed the district court and fashioned new federal law by asserting that
I The chase took place at night but on lighted streets. The youth ran with an
eighteen-inch tire tool stuck down his trousers leg and later held in his hand. The
policeman claimed that he thought it was a gun and that as soon as he realized his
error, he started to put his pistol away. The youth alleged that the policeman shot
him deliberately and that he had taken aim to fire a second time when another
policeman arrived, causing the defendant to put his gun away. Jenkins had neither
committed a crime nor was he subsequently charged with one.
'424 F.2d at 1231.
51d. at 1232.
' For examples of police abuse, see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1963).
" Thelower court's interpretation of North Carolina law is at best questionable.
The North Carolina cases cited by the court of appeals are the following: State
v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 86 S.E.2d 774 (1955); State v. Agnew, 202 N.C. 755, 164
S.E. 578 (1932); State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828 (1922). These
decisions suggest that such might be the rule in criminal actions for assault and
battery. While it is not unreasonable to assume that the court might hold similarly
in civil actions, it has not done so yet. Only a few jurisdictions have so held: e.g.,
Lentine v. McAvoy, 105 Conn. 528, 136 A. 76 (1927) ; Lanbrecht v. Schreyer, 129
Minn. 271, 152 N.W. 645 (1915). Some jurisdictions have explicitly said that only
intentional acts would support the civil claim: e.g., Murray v. Modoc State Bank,
181 Kan. 642, 313 P.2d 304 (1957). Thus for the majority opinion to call the
proposition a "general rule," especially in civil actions in North Carolina, is mis-
leading.
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if intent is required [for recovery under section 1983], it may be
supplied, for federal purposes, by gross and culpable negligence, just
as it was supplied in the common law cause of action.8
Presumably then, for future actions under section 1983, the type of conduct
involved in Jenkins-whether it be labeled as "wanton," "arbitrary," or
"recldess" 9-- may be substituted for the supposed requirement of intent.1
Jenkins is one of a series of cases that have wrestled to determine
the reach of section 1983. The seminal case in the interpretation of the
statute's motivational requirements was Monroe v. Pape':' in which the
Supreme Court held that one acting under color of state law need not
specifically intend a deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights in
order to be liable. Thus, it would be sufficient that a defendant in-
tentionally do the act which led to a deprivation. Prior to Monroe, some
courts had required that the defendant should have acted with specific
intent. This supposed requirement had been carried over from an earlier
Supreme Court decision in Screws v. United States,2 an action based on
the criminal counterpart' s of section 1983, in which specific intent was held
to be an essential element. The Court in Monroe noted the difference in
statutory language; while the criminal statute requires that the defendant
willfully subject the plaintiff to a deprivation, that term does not appear
in the text of section 1983.
Most significant to later interpretations of section 1983 was the
observation in Monroe that "Section 1979 [now 1983] should be read
1424 F.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
' "Gross or culpable negligence" is an imprecise term, especially in North
Carolina. The court in Jenkins seems to use the term as a shorthand expression
of several other labels it put on the defendant's conduct: "reckless use of excessive
force"; "wanton conduct"; "arbitrary and gross abuse of police power"; and "raw
abuse of power." 424 F.2d at 1232.
10 North Carolina, as noted in Jenkins, also holds a policeman liable for criminal
assault if he "arbitrarily and grossly abuse[s] the power confided to him." State v.
Pugh, 101 N.C. 737, 740, 7 S.E. 757 (1888).
11365 U.S. 167 (1961).
1 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
" Now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964):
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments,
pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason
of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment of any term of years
or for life.
19711
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against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions."' 4 The broad language of the
Court would appear to authorize a claim for any type conduct recognized
under tort law principles-whether the claim be based on intent to do
wrong, gross negligence, or simple negligence. The Supreme Court's
invitation to expand the grasp of section 1983 has not brought a uniform
reaction from the courts. Some seem to have ignored it and looked for
different obstacles. Courts have held that the defendant must have acted
with a bad motive. 5 But other courts, in the spirit of Monroe, have
rejected the "bad motive" requirement.' 6 In Joseph v. Rowen 7 police
officers arrested the plaintiff without a search warrant and without prob-
able cause; the plaintiff's claim was allowed under section 1983 even
though there was no showing that the police officers had acted malev-
olently. The court observed that nothing in the statute's language required
restriction to bad motive."8
Although Joseph exemplifies the expansive spirit of Monroe, the type
of conduct required of the defendant for a valid claim under section 1983
depends upon how broadly the courts are willing to interpret the Su-
preme Court's mandate. There appears to be a trend in the courts
toward requiring less sophisticated states of motivation, and after Jenkins,
there is precedent for bringing an action based on gross negligence.
Arguably, a logical extension of Monroe would be to allow recovery on
conduct amounting to simple negligence; however, in most cases brought
under section 1983, the possibility of negligent deprivation has not been
in issue since the acts complained of have been clearly intentional.' 9
Nevertheless, there have been attempts by prisoners in custody of a
1"'Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
" Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1963). In Beauregard v.
Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 183 (S.D. Cal. 1964), the court stated, "[i]n deter-
mining what constitutes lack of 'due process' we think that motive should and does
bear heavily in cases under Section 1983, 42 U.S.C.A. where police officers are in-
volved .... " Accord, Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
" E.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969) (and cases cited at 787).
1402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968), overruling Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1961).
" In those situations where good motive might be a defense to an action under
the federal statute, it is a defense only because the analagous comon law tort claim
would recognize it. 402 F.2d at 369.
"oE.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963) (highway patrolman
blackjacked plaintiff after arrest for driving intoxicated) ; Jackson v. Martin, 261
F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (policeman allegedly shot plaintiff maliciously);
Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.S.C. 1965) (constable stopped car, assaulted
the driver without cause, then arrested him wrongfully).
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state to sue under section 1983 for allegedly negligent medical attention."0
In Hopkins v. County of Cook,21 the court said that mere negligence
was not actionable under the statute. The disallowance of claims based
upon negligence in the prison situation reflects a judicial policy decision
to avoid ensnarlment in suits by prisoners grumbling about the manage-
ment of their captivities.2 2 Although it has been intimated by one court
that in extreme circumstances improper care might form a basis for an
action under section 1983,2s it is unclear whether the court would require
conduct amounting to gross negligence or only simple negligence coupled
with exceptionally shocking results.
A district court has suggested that the logical end to the Monroe
rationale would indeed be an action founded on simple negligence. Dictum
in Huey v. Barloga24 indicates that negligent deprivations of constitutional
rights under color of state law are actionable under section 1983:
Section 1983 has been interpreted to provide a new type of tort:
the invasion, under color of law, of a citizen's constitutional rights.
It is also clear that it is not necessary that this invasion be intentional;
it may merely be negligent.25
However, no court has yet gone as far as the court in Huey suggests is
possible. But Judge Bryan, dissenting in Jenkins, argues that "given the
scope the court now grants it, 1983 would indeed be all-pervasive."'
Despite the fears of Judge Bryan, Jenkins does not appear to herald
the day when claims resulting from simple negligence will be actionable
under section 1983. The federal courts are still looking for an intentional
act-or something that they consider, for federal purposes, as having
the same legal weight. The court in Jenkins makes clear that its "concern
" Jackson v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 422 F.2d 1272 (8th Cir. 1970)
(plaintiff claimed doctor and sheriff had not furnished nonnegligent professional
medical and surgical attention) ; United States ex rel. Gittlemackey v. Pennsylvania,
281 F. Supp. 175, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (plaintiff complained of improper medical
treatment).
21305 F. Supp. 1011, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1969). "It is an abuse of the Civil Rights
Act to characterize a charge of negligence or malpractice, properly questions of state
law, as a violation of constitutional rights."
"E.g., Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 393 (10th Cir. 1968), in which
the court stated that "[t]he internal affairs of prisons, including the discipline,
treatment, and care of prisoners are ordinarily the responsibility of the prison
administrators and are not subject to judicial review."
" Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420, 421 n.3 (9th Cir. 1967)." 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
25 Id. at 872.
28424 F.2d at 1235.
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... is with the raw abuse of power by a police officer.., and not with
simple negligence on the part of a policeman or any other official."-' The
decision to reject section 1983 claims based on simple negligence is not an
irrational line drawing. Assuming that the purpose of the statute is puni-
tive and corrective, as well as compensatory, 28 courts are not unreason-
able to require that the defendant should have intended to do the act
resulting in the deprivation-or at least to have behaved so recklessly or
arbitrarily that the courts will view his actions with the same level of in-
dignation heretofore reserved for intentional deprivations. Simple negli-
gence, even when resulting in the deprivation of constitutional rights,
does not carry the same weight of culpability.
The Jenkiw decision turns heavily on the factual situation. The court
does not suggest a 'eddily apparent standard for the type of conduct now
required for a section 1983 action, other than "gross or culpable neg-
ligence"-a particularly imprecise concept. One suspects that the decision
is a visceral one-more emotional than objective.2 Its utility in future
litigation will depend upon how readily a future court is shocked by the
circumstances of the case then before it.
ELMER LISTON BISHOP, III
C onstitutional Law-Exemption of Church Property From Taxation
Since the birth of the nation, Congress and the states have afforded
religious organizations a favored status under tax legislation.' An im-
portant example of that benevolence is the universal practice of exempting
from ad valorem taxation property owned by religious organizations and
u§ed exclusively for religious purposes. 2 Walz v. Tax Commission of City
27Id. at 1232.
'8 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-87 (1961).
' Notice, for example, the considerable space Judge Sobeloff gives to recounting
the rather remarkable testimony given at the trial. 424 F.2d at 1230-31.
'See, e.g., Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation, 18 TAXES 361
(4940); Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American Church Property, 14 Micir. L.
Rzv. 646 (1916); Note, Constitutionality of the Real Property Church Exemption,
3.6 BRooKLYN L. Rnv. 430 (1970).
'A representative provision is N.C. CoxsT. art. 5, § 5. State constitutional and
statutory provisions for the property tax exemptions are collected in Van Alstyne,
Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461 (1959); Note, The
Establishment Dilemma: Exemption of Religio sly Used Property, 4 SUFFOLx L.
REV. 533 (1970).
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